

## Message Text

PAGE 01 BONN 03574 092004 Z

47

ACTION PM-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 IO-13 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00

USIE-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-09 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 GAC-01

SAL-01 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 OIC-04 T-03 AEC-11 ACDA-19

OMB-01 RSR-01 /146 W

----- 013218

O P 091620 Z MAR 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3781

SECDEF IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USDEL SALT TWO

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PAGE 02 BONN 03574 092004 Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L BONN 3574

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL; HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL; SHAPE FOR POLAD

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM GW NATO PFOR

SUBJECT: MBFR INITIAL TALKS: TRIMMING THE AGENDA

BEGIN SUMMARY: FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH HAS INFORMED US THAT, ONCE HUNGARIAN PROBLEM RESOLVED OR SET ASIDE, FRG DEL WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO ADVOCATE FURTHER SIGNIFICANT LIMITATION OF AGREED MIT GOALS OUTLINED IN GAP. SINCE THE WEST HAS NOT DEFINED SUBSTANTIVE MBFR POSITIONS, ROTH FEARS THAT GAP APPROACH IS BOUND TO YIELD FURTHER ALLIED STRAINS AT MIT. HE BELIEVES MIT GOALS SHOULD BE AGREEMENT ON TIME, VENUE, ALPHABETICAL ORDER, LANGUAGE, DESCRIPTION AND THREE POINT WORKING PROGRAM BROADLY AND NEUTRALLY LIMITED TO ( A ) PHASED APPROACH, ( B ) CONSTRAINTS, ( C ) SIZE AND METHOD OF FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. AMB ROTH TOLD EMBOFF MARCH 8 HE WAS QUITE TROUBLED BY THE DEGREE OF DISCORD SO FAR IN AHG DISCUSSION OF MBFR AGENDA AND FEARED THAT THESE OCCASIONAL SHARP AHG DISAGREEMENTS DID NOT BODE WELL FOR ALLIED COHESION DURING MIT. ROTH RECALLED THAT THE US HAD LEAST DEC PERSUADED ITS SKEPTICAL ALLIES TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OF MIT ESSENTIALLY TO PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS AND SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS RELATED TO SETTING AN AGENDA, WITH AN EYE TO ELABORATING SUBSTANTIVE ALLIED MBFR POSITIONS IN THE SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1973. BUT TO AVOID PRESENTING AN OPEN TARGET FOR SOVIET DIVISIVE TACTICS AT VIENNA, ROTH BELIEVES IT IS NOW NECESSARY FOR THE ALLIES FRANKLY TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE GAP HAD IN FACT ONLY PAPERED OVER THE MOST SERIOUS ALLIED DIFFERENCES, THUS LEAVING THE WEST IN A POOR POSITION TO ADDRESS IN A UNITED FASHION EVEN SUBSTANCE RELATED TO SETTING AN AGENDA. UNTIL THE US INFORMS ITS ALLIES OF ITS SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH TO AND GOALS IN MBFR, ROTH SAID HE AND HIS BRITISH COLLEAGUES ARE CONVINCED THAT THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION WILL CONTINUE TO PREVAIL. ROTH SAID HE THEREFORE HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT IS NECESSARY FURTHER TO TAILOR ALLIED GOALS AT MIT.

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PAGE 03 BONN 03574 092004 Z

2. IN PARTICULAR, ROTH BELIEVES THE ALLIES SHOULD HOLD TO A MINIMUM THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING AN AGENDA OR WORK PROGRAM. ONCE THE HUNGARIAN PROBLEM IS RESOLVED OR SET ASIDE, ROTH PLANS TO INSTRUCT FRG DELS IN NATO AND VIENNA TO ADVOCATE A THREE POINT MBFR WORK PROGRAM, FORMULATED IN SUITABLY BROAD AND NEUTRAL TERMS. THE 3 POINTS WOULD BE: ( A ) " STEP BY STEP APPROACH", ( READ " PHASED INTEGRAL PROGRAM"); ( B ) IN ORDER TO GET PROPER BASIS FOR REDUCTIONS, " CONFIDENCE AND STABILIZING MES-

SURES", ( READ " PRE- REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS"); ( C ) " SIZE AND METHODS OF FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN NEGOTIATIONS".

3. ROTH SAID HE IS PREPARED TO DROP PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FROM THE AGENDA. HE ALSO IS PREPARED TO DROP AREA, VERIFICATION AND PARTICIPATION, ALL OF WHICH IN HIS VIEW MUST IN ANY EVENT BE RESOLVED IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

4. BESIDES THE ABOVE RATHER LIMITED WORK PROGRAM, ROTH SAID HE AGREED WITH THE US POSITION THAT IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO FIX A PRECISE DATE TO START MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN SEPT OR OCTOBER, THEREBY MULTILATERALLY SEALING THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO BEGIN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ON A DATE CERTAIN. ROTH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE UK HAD STARTED TO FUDGE ON THE NEED FOR A SPECIFIC DATE, BUT SAID THE FRG DOES NOT SHARE THIS BRITISH POSITION, WHICH HE THOUGHT WAS RELATED TO THE FAILURE OF THE ALLIANCE SO FAR TO AGREE ON SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS ON MBFR. ROTH SAID THE GERMANS WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE US DESIRE TO FIX A DATE CERTAIN AS LONG AS ( A ) US CARRIES OUT COMMITMENT TO GIVE THIS SPRING A CLEAR INDICATION OF ITS APPROACH TO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND ( B ) MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN 1973 ARE DE FACTO LIMITED TO EXPLORATIONS; ROTH BELIEVES INITIAL ALLIED NEGOTIATING OPTIONS COULD BE TABLED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SPRING OF 1974, AFTER THE ALLIANCE HAD A CHANCE TO DEVELOP ITS NEGOTIATING POSITIONS.

5. IN ADDITION TO WORK PROGRAM AND DATE, ROTH SAID MIT SHOULD AGREE ON VENUE ( HE EXPRESSED NO PREFERENCE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF MBFR ALONE), ALPHABETICAL ORDER, AND LANGUAGES. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE MIT MUST AGREE ON A DESCRIPTION FOR THE TALKS AND SAID HE IS INCLINED TO FAVOR MUTUAL ARMS LIMITATION TALKS ( MALT). BUTH ROTH'S READI-  
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PAGE 04 BONN 03574 092004 Z

NESS TO DROP THE MBFR MONIKER DOES NOT IMPLY A LESSENED GERMAN COMMITMENT TO THE NEED FOR " BALANCE" IN ANY MBFR AGREEMENT OR AGREEMENTS. IN THIS CONNECTION DIFFERENT FORCE STRUCTURES, GEOGRAPHY, EQUIPMENT, AND NUCLEAR ATTRIBUTES OF THE TWO BLOCS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION AND THE FRG WOULD, ROTH INSISTED, SIGN NO TREATY WHICH FAILED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACCOUNT OF " BALANCE".

6. IN CONCLUSION, ROTH SAID HE REMAINED CONFIDENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD AGREE TO BEGIN THE MBFR TALKS THIS FALL PER THEIR SEPT 12 SOVIET AGREEMENT WITH DR. KISSINGER. HE ADDED IN PASSING THAT ONE DISAPPOINTMENT OF THE MIT TO DATE WAS THE VERY LIMITED ABILITY OF WARSAW PACT STATES EFFECTIVELY TO DEFEND THEIR OWN INTERESTS WHEN THOSE INTERESTS WERE PERCEIVED BY MOSCOW TO BE AT EVEN SLIGHT VARIANCE WITH THOSE OF THE USSR. ROTH SAID FONOFF EXPERTS

BELIEVED THAT THE MBFR TALKS WOULD HAVE AN INITIALLY RESTRICTIVE AND DISCIPLINING EFFECT ON EASTERN EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT BUT, IN THE LONG RUN, IF THE TALKS WENT WELL, IT MIGHT AFFORD EE'S A CHANCE TO SPEAK OUT SOMEWHAT MORE FOR THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS.

7. EMBOFF THANKED ROTH FOR THIS ADVANCE NOTICE OF FRG INTENTIONS RE THE SCOPE OF THE MBFR AGENDA AND SAID HE WOULD PASS THIS INFO DISCREETLY TO APPROPRIATE US AUTHORITIES. EMBOFF DID COMMENT, HOWEVER, THAT ROTH'S PRESENTATION OBVIOUSLY VARIED CONSIDERABLY FROM THE AGREED ALLIANCE POSITION IN THE GAP. HILLENBRAND

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ATHENS  
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BUCHAREST  
BUDAPEST  
COPENHAGEN

THE HAGUE  
HELSINKI  
LISBON  
LONDON  
MOSCOW  
OSLO  
OTTAWA  
PARIS  
PRAGUE  
REYKJAVIK  
ROME  
SOFIA  
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